



Contact:

Laura Wonser, Senior Executive Assistant

GFSF/GIC Group

www.gicgroup.com

laura.wonser@gicgroup.com

GFSF: www.globalfoodsafetyforum.org



GFSF FOCUS 2026

A New Stage in Food Safety

Digital Traceability and Product Assurance in
Preprepared Dish Sector in China

Content



❖ Digital Traceability and Product Assurance in Preprepared Dish Sector in
China

By: Zehao Naomi Liu

Digital Traceability and Product Assurance in Preprepared Dish Sector in China

By: Zehao Naomi Liu

Introduction

The preprepared-dish debate is often presented as a choice between convenience and freshness. For food-safety leaders, the more useful question is evidentiary: can a firm or regulator determine which ingredients entered a lot, which controls were applied, whether conditions remained within validated limits, where the lot moved, and what action followed an exception? Industrial production can increase opacity at the point of consumption, but it can also generate more consistent and auditable evidence than dispersed preparation. The sector's credibility will depend on whether that evidence remains connected across farms, processors, cold stores, logistics providers, digital platforms, and restaurants.

China's current sector-specific reference point is the National Health Commission's February 2026 draft National Food Safety Standard for Preprepared Dishes. The draft retains the scope first articulated in 2024: industrially preprocessed, prepackaged dishes made from edible agricultural products, without added preservatives, and requiring heating or cooking before consumption, but converts that policy direction into proposed controls for raw materials, processing, contaminants, microorganisms, packaging, labelling, storage, transport, and preparation instructions. It also recommends a shelf life of no more than twelve months. Ready-to-eat foods, staple foods, minimally processed produce, and products supplied by central kitchens to their own chain outlets remain outside the definition (NHC 2026; Xinhua 2026).

The analysis develops a technical framework for product assurance. Its central claim is that compliance should be supported by four linked evidence layers: identity and event data, process and condition data, biological and authenticity evidence, and analytical decision records. That structure is consistent with Codex principles but goes beyond a consumer-facing QR code or a stand-alone blockchain.

Regulatory Foundation

Rapid market growth exposed a mismatch between multi-ingredient, multi-stage products and rules organized around older food categories. Regulators also faced recurring operational problems, such as uncertain classification, uneven contaminant criteria, microbial hazards, ingredient authenticity, cold-chain control, and weak disclosure at the restaurant interface. The 2026 draft therefore addresses both the standards gap and evidence from targeted supervision (Liu et al. 2025; NHC 2026).

Broad sampling suggests that baseline performance can be good. A Guangdong study selected 8,910 prepared-dish samples from the province's 2021–2023 supervision database and reported compliance above 99 percent for all tested categories except the microbiological indicator for meat products. Yet a separate authenticity screen of 20 frozen meat products detected animal-derived components other than those expected in 15 samples. The latter finding is a vulnerability signal, because fraud requires evidence of intent and the interpretation depends on the declared formulation and method. Even so, the combination of microbial concerns and species mismatch explains why a sector standard needs both conventional safety criteria and authenticity controls (Liu et al. 2025).

The Codex General Principles of Food Hygiene place primary responsibility on food business operators and organize preventive control through good hygiene practices and hazard analysis and critical control point systems (Codex Alimentarius Commission 2022). Codex traceability guidance defines product tracing as the ability to follow food movement through specified stages of production, processing, and distribution. It also states an essential limitation: traceability is a tool within a food inspection and certification system, not a safety outcome by itself (Codex Alimentarius Commission 2006). A record system strengthens prevention and recall only when it is paired with controls, verification, and authority to act.

China's Food Safety Law implementation framework already requires producers and operators to establish traceability arrangements and retain truthful purchasing, inspection, production, and sales records (State Council of the People's Republic of China 2019). The February 2026 preprepared-dish draft is now the principal sector-specific standards reference and proposes more explicit requirements for ingredient acceptance, production hygiene, microbial and contaminant control, packaging, labels, cooking instructions, and cold-chain conditions (NHC 2026). It sits within a broader 2026 modernization of China's food-safety standards. On April 17, the NHC released 37 additional draft standards covering, among other subjects, special-dietary labelling, food additives, nutrient fortification substances, food-contact materials, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon control, and microbiological methods for diarrhoeagenic *Escherichia coli*, *Staphylococcus aureus*, *Vibrio parahaemolyticus*, molds, and yeasts (USDA FAS 2026).

Regulation should therefore specify minimum evidence and performance rather than mandate a particular vendor or database. Each finished lot should link to ingredient lots, supplier and facility identifiers, formula version, production and packaging times, critical control measurements, laboratory results, storage limits, custody changes, deviations, disposition decisions, and destinations. Transformation events must document which inputs became which outputs. Splitting, commingling, rework, repacking, relabeling, and disposal are equally important because they are common points of traceability failure.

Integrated Digital Assurance Architecture

An assurance architecture should separate technologies according to the question each can answer. Identification technologies establish which object is being discussed. Event standards establish what happened, when, where, and in what business context. Sensors document environmental or process conditions. Laboratory methods characterize hazards or test authenticity claims. Analytics prioritize records for review. Governance determines whether evidence is admissible, who may alter it, and what decision follows. Figure 1 summarizes these relationships.




Figure 1 Evidence architecture for preprepared dish assurance

Source Author's formulation based on Codex Alimentarius Commission 2006 and GS1 2022

Identity Events and Cold Chain Evidence

Persistent identity is the first layer. Barcodes, two-dimensional codes, radio-frequency identification, and serialized logistics labels offer different levels of granularity; none is inherently sufficient. A consumer QR code may disclose ingredients, preparation instructions, nutrition, or recall status, while RFID may improve pallet and reusable-container handling. The compliance control is the continuing association between the physical object and the authoritative lot record through aggregation, division, and transformation.

Interoperable event models allow unlike systems to exchange that evidence. GS1 Electronic Product Code Information Services records the object, time, place, and business context of an event and can associate sensor information with it (GS1 2022). ISO 22005 provides general principles for food-chain traceability system design (ISO 2007). These voluntary standards are not substitutes for Chinese law, but they demonstrate how regulators can define a minimum dataset without requiring every operator to purchase the same platform.

Cold-chain evidence should capture more than temperature at receipt. Calibrated loggers, connected sensors, and time-temperature indicators can document the magnitude and duration of an excursion. The record must identify the sensor, calibration status, product lot, custody holder, applicable limit, alert, investigation, and disposition. A temperature alert without a validated product-specific decision rule is information, not a release decision.

Whole Genome Sequencing and Microbial Attribution

WGS adds a biological evidence layer by characterizing microbial isolates at high resolution. It can connect dispersed clinical, food, and environmental isolates; distinguish persistent facility strains from repeated introductions; and support outbreak detection, source attribution, root-cause investigation, and monitoring of virulence or antimicrobial-resistance determinants. WHO guidance emphasizes that useful implementation requires laboratory quality systems, epidemiological capacity, bioinformatics, contextual metadata, and data governance, not only sequencing equipment (WHO 2023a; WHO 2023b).

The technology is particularly relevant to facilities producing multiple chilled or ready-to-heat dishes. A recurring genomic cluster in drains, slicers, cold rooms, ingredients, or finished products may reveal a persistent harborage site or common source. When sequence results are linked to environmental maps, sanitation records, lot genealogy, distribution events, and complaints, investigators can narrow the population of implicated product and test competing causal hypotheses.

WGS must not be oversold. It does not follow a package, establish the direction of transmission, or compensate for biased sampling. Genomic similarity thresholds depend on the organism, context, pipeline, and available background diversity. Laboratories therefore need validated workflows, proficiency testing, versioned bioinformatics, reference materials, metadata standards, and rules for sharing results. The appropriate claim is that WGS strengthens attribution when combined with epidemiology and traceability, not that sequence similarity alone proves liability.

Artificial Intelligence and Decision Governance

Artificial intelligence can integrate data that conventional sampling plans treat separately: supplier history, ingredient prices, inspection findings, environmental-monitoring trends, sensor excursions, laboratory results, complaints, weather, and logistics delays. Models can rank lots or suppliers for verification, detect improbable mass balances, identify duplicate or altered certificates, forecast microbial risk, flag unusual relabeling or shelf-life extensions, and use computer vision to identify packaging or sanitation anomalies. A 2026 proof-of-concept study compiled 12,121 prepared-dish inspection records, including 668 noncompliant records,

and 11,110 incident reports to demonstrate multi-source risk classification and prioritization. Its 5.51 percent noncompliance share describes the assembled research dataset and should therefore be used to demonstrate analytical feasibility rather than sector prevalence (Liu, Song, and Guo 2026).

For compliance decisions, however, a model output is a risk signal rather than proof of a violation. Governance should document intended use, training-data provenance, feature definitions, validation population, performance by product category, error costs, drift monitoring, model version, human review, override authority, and appeal. These controls are especially important when small suppliers have sparse data or when historical inspections reflect unequal surveillance intensity. An accurate model can still be unfit for purpose if its alert cannot be explained, reproduced, or converted into a proportionate verification action.

The strongest design combines rules and learning. Hard controls should reject impossible or prohibited events, such as an expired certificate or missing critical-control measurement. Statistical and machine-learning models should prioritize plausible but unusual patterns. Investigators should record the evidence reviewed and the resulting disposition. That feedback can improve the system while preserving an auditable separation between prediction and enforcement.

Food Fraud and Authenticity

Food-safety programs principally address unintentional hazards. Food fraud involves intentional deception for economic gain, although it may create severe public-health consequences. Spink and Moyer distinguish food fraud from food safety, food defense, and quality according to intent and consequence and argue for a shift from incident response toward prevention (Spink and Moyer 2011). Later work led by Michigan State University's John Spink translates that distinction into policy and implementation: organizations should assess vulnerabilities and reduce the opportunity and attractiveness of fraud rather than depend only on end-product detection (Spink et al. 2016; Spink 2019).

Preprepared dishes contain several structural vulnerabilities. Complex recipes can conceal substitution of animal species, cuts, oils, seasonings, or geographic origin. Price volatility and multiple tiers of suppliers create economic incentives. Business-to-business packaging is invisible to diners, and transformation makes visual verification difficult. Other schemes include undeclared allergens, false organic or halal claims, fabricated certificates, relabelled production dates, unauthorized rework, and diversion of rejected product.

Digital traceability can narrow opportunity, but it cannot make an untrue input record true. Controls must reconcile records with physical evidence. Mass-balance tests should

compare verified inputs, yields, waste, inventory, and output. Supplier identity, invoices, and certificates should be authenticated. DNA barcoding or metabarcoding can test species claims; stable-isotope analysis can support selected origin or production claims; and spectroscopy, chromatography, mass spectrometry, or nuclear magnetic resonance can evaluate compositional fingerprints (Danezis et al. 2016). These methods answer different questions from WGS. Sequencing a pathogen isolate supports microbial attribution; species-targeted DNA or chemical analysis is normally more relevant to economic substitution.

AI can identify unlikely prices, shared certificate templates, abnormal supplier networks, mismatched ingredient and label claims, or deviations from expected analytical profiles. Yet adaptive offenders may fabricate digital histories or manipulate model inputs. A food-fraud vulnerability assessment should therefore consider motive, opportunity, detectability, supplier relationships, market disruptions, control effectiveness, and the public-health consequence of substitution. Testing resources can then be directed toward claims whose falsification is both attractive and consequential.

Quality and Nutritional Standards

Safety, quality, authenticity, and nutrition are related but not interchangeable. A dish may satisfy microbial and contaminant limits while containing less of a valued ingredient than declared, showing unacceptable texture after thawing, or delivering excessive sodium. A nutritionally balanced formulation may still be unsafe if cooking or cold-chain controls fail. Reporting these dimensions separately prevents a broad claim such as high quality or traceable from obscuring a material weakness.

Product specifications should define identity, ingredient proportions, net content, sensory tolerances, package integrity, thaw stability, shelf-life performance, and acceptable lot variation. Formula-version control is essential. An ingredient substitution may alter allergen status, nutrient content, safety margins, cooking instructions, and sensory performance; the digital record should therefore trigger reassessment rather than silently inherit an earlier specification. Quality drift can also be an early fraud signal when a lower-value input remains technically safe.

Codex nutrition-labelling guidance standardizes nutrient declarations and supports truthful, nonmisleading claims (Codex Alimentarius Commission 1985). China's GB 28050-2025 will take effect on March 16, 2027, and adds saturated fat and sugars to mandatory core declarations; official guidance also emphasizes that declared nutrient values should truthfully reflect composition within allowed tolerances (NHC 2025a; NHC 2025b). China's digital-label framework permits supplementary information on ingredient source, processing, origin, use, traceability, safety, and nutrition when physical space is limited (NHC and SAMR 2025).

For retail products, nutrition information should be available per 100 grams and, where useful, per realistic consumed portion after preparation. For dishes sold through restaurants, standardized business-to-business specifications should transmit nutrient and allergen data even when the industrial package is not visible to the diner. Category-specific reformulation targets are preferable to a single threshold across soups, braised meats, grain dishes, and vegetables. Nutrient or ingredient claims should be verified against formulation control, analytical tolerances, and mass balance.

Conclusion

The decisive measure of digitalization is not the number of QR codes, sensors, sequences, or models deployed. It is whether evidence remains attached to the correct lot, survives organizational handoffs, exposes anomalies early, and supports a defensible decision when prevention fails. WGS, AI, event standards, and authenticity testing are complementary because they answer different questions. Their value emerges only when identifiers, metadata, validation, and authority connect them.

China's developing preprepared-dish standard can establish a regulatory floor. The sector's larger opportunity is to create a performance-based assurance architecture that covers safety, fraud, quality, and nutrition without confusing one outcome for another. If regulation specifies the evidence that must accompany a lot while allowing interoperable technologies to evolve, the sector can make industrial convenience more visible, verifiable, and trustworthy. Recent evidence indicates the regulatory objective should be demonstrable control performance, not confidence based only on a label or technology claim.

References

- Codex Alimentarius Commission. 1985. Guidelines on Nutrition Labelling. CXG 2-1985. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Health Organization. Available at <https://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/thematic-areas/nutrition-labelling/en/>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- Codex Alimentarius Commission. 2006. Principles for Traceability/Product Tracing as a Tool within a Food Inspection and Certification System. CXG 60-2006. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Health Organization. Available at <https://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/codex-texts/guidelines/en/>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- Codex Alimentarius Commission. 2022. General Principles of Food Hygiene. CXC 1-1969. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Health Organization. Available at <https://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/codex-texts/codes-of-practice/en/>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- Danezis, G.P., A.S. Tsagkaris, F. Camin, V. Brusic, and C.A. Georgiou. 2016. “Food Authentication: Techniques, Trends and Emerging Approaches.” *TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry* 85:123–132. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trac.2016.02.026>.
- GS1. 2022. EPCIS and Core Business Vocabulary Version 2.0.1. Brussels: GS1. Available at <https://ref.gs1.org/standards/epcis/>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- Liu, A.-Y., L. Lin, X.-S. Liao, C.-M. Fu, X.-Y. Guo, and Y. Lei. 2025. ‘Analysis on the Quality and Safety Status of Prepared Dishes in Guangdong Province from 2021 to 2023.’ *Journal of Food Safety & Quality* 16(8):302–309. <https://doi.org/10.19812/j.cnki.jfsq11-5956/ts.20241206004>.
- Liu, G., C. Song, and J. Guo. 2026. ‘Risk Analysis Based on Multi-Source Data and Artificial Intelligence: A Case Study of Pre-Made Dishes.’ *Applied Sciences* 16(10):5117. <https://doi.org/10.3390/app16105117>.
- International Organization for Standardization. 2007. Traceability in the Feed and Food Chain—General Principles and Basic Requirements for System Design and Implementation. ISO 22005:2007. Geneva: ISO.
- National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 2025a. Questions and Answers on GB 28050-2025 National Food Safety Standard General Standard for Nutrition Labelling of Prepackaged Foods. Beijing. Available at <https://www.nhc.gov.cn/sps/c100087/202509/470fa4ff5de14dd38619223cce9da4e7.shtml>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 2025b. Announcement on the Release of GB 7718-2025 and Fifty National Food Safety Standards and Nine Amendments. Beijing. Available at <https://www.nhc.gov.cn/wjw/zcwjgg/202503/97802a2683b840dd8be0e1449982c6a5.shtml>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 2026. Letter Soliciting Public Comments on the Draft National Food Safety Standard for Preprepared Dishes. Beijing. Available at

- <https://www.nhc.gov.cn/sps/c100087/202602/895e1a278b3b4a3dad3292314770ace5.shtml>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China and State Administration for Market Regulation. 2025. Announcement on Implementing Digital Labels for Prepackaged Foods. Beijing. Available at <https://www.nhc.gov.cn/sps/c100088/202509/07b01e0a2fff482789cbb8c400c649a2.shtml>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- Spink, J. 2019. *Food Fraud Prevention: Introduction, Implementation, and Management*. New York: Springer.
- Spink, J., N.D. Fortin, D.C. Moyer, H. Miao, and Y. Wu. 2016. "Food Fraud Prevention: Policy, Strategy, and Decision-Making—Implementation Steps for a Government Agency or Industry." *CHIMIA International Journal for Chemistry* 70(5):320–328. <https://doi.org/10.2533/chimia.2016.320>.
- Spink, J., and D.C. Moyer. 2011. "Defining the Public Health Threat of Food Fraud." *Journal of Food Science* 76(9):R157–R163. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-3841.2011.02417.x>.
- State Administration for Market Regulation, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and National Health Commission. 2024. Notice on Strengthening Food Safety Supervision of Preprepared Dishes and Promoting High-Quality Industry Development. *Guo Shi Jian Shi Sheng Fa* [2024] No. 27. Available at <https://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/claw/clawContent.shtml?id=99588>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- State Council of the People's Republic of China. 2019. Regulation on the Implementation of the Food Safety Law of the People's Republic of China. Available at <https://xzfg.moj.gov.cn/front/law/detail?LawID=295>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- World Health Organization. 2023a. *Whole Genome Sequencing as a Tool to Strengthen Foodborne Disease Surveillance and Response: Introductory Module*. Geneva: World Health Organization. Available at <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240021228>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- World Health Organization. 2023b. *Whole Genome Sequencing as a Tool to Strengthen Foodborne Disease Surveillance and Response: Whole Genome Sequencing in Foodborne Disease Routine Surveillance*. Geneva: World Health Organization. Available at <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240021266>. Accessed September 10, 2026.
- Xinhua. 2026. "Six Questions and Answers on the Draft National Standards for Preprepared Dishes." February 6. Available at <https://www.news.cn/politics/20260206/9ed77650057e4810ada4037f9a65b3db/c.html>. Accessed September 10, 2026.